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Abstract: Do public condemnations by the United Nations human rights bodies lead to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) loss for abusive regimes? The Human Rights Commission and later 
Council (UNHRCC) are internationally legitimized tools where member states shame repressive 
regimes for human rights violations in public resolutions. We argue that these resolutions can 
influence foreign investors in two main ways: (1) They signal that a state is an outcast, unable to 
secure alliances within the UN human rights bodies that protect it from being publicly shamed, 
with negative consequences for investment attractiveness (‘outcast’ effect). (2) They signal that a 
state is one of the most rogue, severe human rights violators because voting members of the 
UNHRCC may be aware of many human rights violations, but they pass resolutions only in the 
harshest cases (‘bottleneck’ effect). Any MNC associated with such a country risks severe 
reputational damage. Results from a panel data analysis of 165 countries (1977-2013) confirm 
that UNHRCC condemnations deter FDI. This effect is amplified by media reporting of human 
rights abuse, and stronger and more robust than a bad human rights record of a state itself. NGO 
shaming and milder UNHRCC sanctions (which do not reach resolution stage) have less strong 
effects, although the result on NGO shaming is to be seen with caution due to a reduced sample 
size.  
Keywords: FDI, Human rights, Repression, UN Human Rights Commission and Council, 
Naming and Shaming 
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It is widely argued that a country’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) 
depends not only on economic factors, but also on the political environment (Schneider and Frey 
1985, Busse and Hefeker 2007, Globerman and Shapiro 2002). Within the political sphere, the 
role of human rights protection has received great attention in the fields of International 
Relations and Development. The conventional wisdom used to be that foreign investors are 
drawn to repressive host countries which offer cheap labor and lax regulation of businesses 
(Hymer 1979; Smith, Bolyard and Ippolito 1999). However, more recent empirical work has 
provided evidence that better human rights protection is connected to higher FDI inflows, 
indicating that firms seek political stability (Schneider and Frey 1985) and improved human 
capital (Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef, 2001), which are connected to better human rights 
protection (Blanton and Blanton 2006, 2007b). 
An emerging key factor in explaining the link between human rights and FDI is shaming 
activities by state and non-state actors. The growing literature on general shaming effects has 
tended to focus on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which publicize human rights 
abuses to force repressive regimes to comply with international human rights norms (Risse, Ropp 
and Sikkink 1999). One way to exert pressure on these states is through economic costs. For 
example, Barry, Clay and Flynn (2013) show that naming and shaming by human rights NGOs 
reduces FDI in developing nations because it creates reputational costs for foreign investors. 
Peterson, Murdie and Asal (2016) find that after NGO shaming, citizens may engage in boycotts 
or lobby their governments to reconsider trade agreements with abusive states. The result is a 
loss in exports for repressive regimes. 
We know much less about the role of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and their 
shaming activities. We do know that IGO shaming tends to reduce political repression (DeMeritt 
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2012, Franklin 2008, Krain 2012), but it is not clear if this link works via successful norm 
diffusion among states, or via economic pressures such as FDI loss. This study therefore 
examines the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, later replaced by the UN Human 
Rights Council (hereafter UNHRCC collectively) as a key player that can negatively influence 
economic outcomes for repressive regimes. Being lobbied and informed by activists, the 
UNHRCC can provide the potentially most damaging form of public condemnation. It is the 
primary forum in which governments publicly shame other nations for human rights abuse 
(Lebovic and Voeten 2006). When the UNHRCC adopts a resolution against a repressive regime, 
it provides a member-state-authorized, legitimate and internationally highly visible type of 
shaming. International institutions such as the UNHRCC are “the primary vehicles for stating 
community norms and for collective legitimation” (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 8). Unlike shaming 
by NGOs, a majority vote by member governments has to be reached before a public 
condemnation is issued. Fearing the consequences, target countries go to great lengths to avoid 
being publicly criticized in this way and appear to see such resolutions “as the most weighty 
penalty” and a “severe sanction” (Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 865). Indeed, shaming by the 
United Nations human rights bodies has been shown to cause loss of foreign and multilateral aid 
(Lebovic and Voeten 2009, Esarey and DeMeritt 2016), but we do not know how effective such 
shaming is in deterring foreign investors. We ask: Do public condemnations by the UNHRCC 
lead to FDI loss for shamed governments? 
 Our study makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature. Based on 
theories about political, social and economic risk, we propose two main causal pathways. First, 
voting patterns within the UNHRCC have been shown to be influenced by power and political 
alliances of the voting members (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). Before the reform of the human 
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rights body in 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2005) criticized a “politicization of its 
sessions”. Lebovic and Voeten (2006) have shown that through partisanship and strategic voting, 
states tended to protect their allies from UNHRCC shaming, especially before the end of the 
Cold War. How could this affect FDI? When a country is condemned by a UNHRCC resolution, 
this might be seen as a signal that the government is unable to call upon strong alliances and 
political favors among other voting members. This could reflect damaged bilateral relations with 
other states, including a lack of bilateral economic support for foreign investors and less 
favorable trade and investment agreements. The shamed country – an outcast in the international 
community - may even be subject to future material sanctions. This makes it a host country 
which is much less attractive for FDI than other states (‘outcast’ effect’). 
Second, Lebovic and Voeten (2006) have emphasized that many target countries were 
also shamed based on their actual human rights record, with the main goal of shining a negative 
spotlight on such abuse (Spar 1998). UNHRCC condemnations can create reputational damage 
to firms by pointing to the fact that they provide capital to repressive regimes, thereby extending 
the spotlight from shamed governments to foreign investors (Spar 1998, Barry et al. 2013). Since 
firms have increasingly committed themselves to human rights norms (Mwangi et al. 2013), they 
have become more vulnerable to public criticism and boycotts when they finance repressive 
regimes or become complicit in rights violations. The UNHRCC can therefore create 
direct reputational risk to firms which invest in repressive regimes. Since the UNHRCC passes a 
resolution only in the harshest cases – unlike NGOs, which target a wider range of violations and 
states – it acts as a bottleneck, so that a UNHRCC resolution signals a risk of severe reputational 
damage for abusive states and their investors (‘bottleneck’ effect). 
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To provide further insights into shaming and FDI, we also integrate the media. It is 
usually through the megaphone of the media that information about human rights abuse reaches a 
wide audience of consumers, shareholders, employees, activists and firm decision makers (Pruce 
and Budabin 2016). Some reports by NGOs may remain unnoticed to foreign audiences; 
UNHRCC resolutions may be too technical for a wide audience to make sense of. But the 
“communicative processes” and accessibility (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 37) of the media, with 
human interest stories and local features, can be a crucial amplifier of shaming activities. In 
another context, the power of the media has been demonstrated by connecting it to loss of 
foreign aid and increased economic sanctions (Peksen et al. 2014, Nielsen 2013).  
In our empirical contribution, the results from our panel data analysis of 165 countries 
(1977-2013) provide strong support that UNHRCC shaming is connected to less FDI flows. 
Human rights abuse itself also has a negative effect on FDI, but to a substantially smaller degree, 
indicating that it is the act of UNHRCC shaming that ‘counts’. NGO shaming or milder forms of 
UNHRCC sanctions which do not reach the resolution stage have less strong effects, although 
the result on NGO shaming is to be seen with caution due to a reduced sample size. We further 
find that UNHRCC shaming is conditional on media reporting about repressive regimes. Our 
results are stable across a range of robustness checks.  
By focusing on the most powerful shaming body, the UNHRCC and by integrating the 
media amplifier, this study provides a comprehensive and novel approach to the human rights 
and FDI literature. Since FDI is one of the biggest drivers of economic development, and 
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governments try to attract investment and prevent FDI loss,1  human rights shaming by the 
UNHRCC can be an important tool to improve human rights protection worldwide. 
  The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We first discuss the relevance and nature 
of UNHRCC condemnations, and present the theoretical arguments and hypotheses. In the main 
part, the data and models are discussed, and we present the main results and robustness checks. 
The conclusion highlights policy implications and future research avenues. 
 
Shaming by the UN Human Rights Bodies 
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights was formed in 1946 and operated until 2006, 
when it was replaced by the Human Rights Council.2 In the first 20 years of its existence, the 
Commission was primarily concerned with setting standards in the field of human rights, rather 
than dealing with human rights complaints. It developed the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were adopted by 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966. From then onwards, the Commission assumed 
a more interventionist role. Through Special Rapporteurs and working groups, it monitored 
human rights compliance by member states and performed fact-finding missions in order to 
investigate alleged human rights violations (OHCHR, 2016a). The main purpose of the 53-
member Commission soon became to voice concerns about gross offender states. In other words, 
it provided a highly-visible international forum through which member states publicly 
condemned other governments for human rights violations.  
                                                
1 For example, the withdrawal of FDI can lead to job loss and a decline in government tax revenues (Howard-
Hassmann (2010). 
2 This study will treat them collectively as the United Nations Human Rights Commission & Council (UNHRCC) in 
the following sections. 
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The main and strongest mechanism of public condemnation was through resolutions, 
which openly criticized individual repressive regimes and their human rights record. Before 
reaching ‘resolution stage’, however, the UNHRCC sanction process followed several steps with 
rising intensity of shaming. First, the Commission could discuss an allegation against a state but 
not pursue it further. Second, the Commission could decide to continue deliberations in closed 
sessions, suggesting that the allegations behind the resolution may have some merit. The third 
option consisted of a mild condemnation by issuing a critical statement from the chair of the 
commission and in the form of advisory procedures. Fourth, being the highest form of sanction, 
the Commission could adopt a resolution publicly condemning the accused country for 
committing human rights violations (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). 3 States would obviously prefer 
the first three milder steps in the sanction process, and try to avoid a resolution. We focus on 
resolutions here, as the most severe public condemnation, but we consider effects of the lower 
levels as well. 
These resolutions fulfil an important function to publicly condemn states that violate 
rights of their citizens by bringing international attention to their wrongdoings. NGOs and rights 
activists inform and lobby the Commission to “put the norm-violating state on the international 
agenda” (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 22), creating additional international attention. For example, 
between 1977 and 2013, the human rights body targeted 95 countries and adopted resolutions to 
shame 38 countries at least once, with the goal of pressuring these countries to comply with 
international human rights norms. During these shaming processes, the Commission itself 
became subject to criticism. Voting members and countries taking over chairmanship of the body 
were not always committed to human rights protection themselves; and alliances within the 
                                                
3 This final step, adopting a resolution, is what this study will refer to as “public condemnation”. 
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human rights body influenced public shaming activities (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). After such 
concerns about the political motivation behind public condemnations,4  the Commission was 
replaced by the United Nations Human Rights Council in March 2006. In its reformed version, 
the new 47-member states, each serving three-year terms, were still tasked with addressing 
human rights violations worldwide, but now members were elected by the General Assembly 
based on their contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights (OHCHR, 2016b). 
All countries are now subject to scrutiny via the newly established Universal Periodic Review 
which examines the human rights compliance of all 193 UN member states on a regular basis 
(Terman and Voeten 2017). Resolutions are still the main form of UNHRCC sanction. Since 
only the most severe rights violations will reach the resolution stage, and a wide agreement 
among the member states is necessary for action, a resolution by the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights and later Council constitutes the highest, internationally legitimized, and most 
visible form of condemning repressive regimes. 
 
UNHRCC condemnations and FDI 
Shaming constitutes an important component in the ‘spiral model’ of human rights norm 
diffusion (Risse and Sikkink 1999) and can have a range of effects that may ultimately influence 
states to commit to and implement human rights protection. Shaming can work by directly 
engaging governments in dialogue about potential improvements. This often goes hand in hand 
with creating material pressures on states’ economies, for example by creating a risk of loss of 
foreign aid or donor support. We turn our focus towards FDI, because many states which repress 
their citizens are also highly dependent on foreign investment. In order to attract and maintain 
                                                
4 Despite the criticism, Lebovic and Voeten (2006) found that the Commission’s resolutions were generally in line 
with actual human rights violations, and not purely motivated by states’ agendas and alliances.  
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benefits such as growth, skills transfers, revenues and economic development from FDI (Moran 
2006), many nations compete for investment from abroad, and go through great lengths to avoid 
the loss of FDI (Cooray et al. 2014). In a revised version of the spiral model, the authors have 
therefore emphasized the “growing importance of non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations” (Risse and Ropp 2013, 9) for human rights improvement. 
 For example, between 1992 and 1997,5 the Commission on human rights adopted several 
resolutions against the repressive regime in Myanmar,6  which was followed by a wave of 
divestment (Spar 1998). In March 2002, the Commission expressed “concern at the seriousness 
of the human rights situation in Myanmar” and wrote that it “[d]eplores the fact that the 
Government of Myanmar, despite the assurances given at various times that it would take firm 
steps towards the establishment of a democratic State, has not to this day fulfilled those 
commitments” (OHCHR 1992, 2). Three months later, Levi Strauss was one of the first major 
foreign investors withdrawing from the country, stating that “It is not possible to do business in 
[Burma] without directly supporting the military government and its pervasive violations of 
human rights” (see Carment and Schnabel 2004, 373). In each of the following years the 
Commission issued a resolution on Myanmar. In 1994, it shamed the regime by stating that it 
was 
“[g]ravely concerned at the violations of human rights in Myanmar which remain 
extremely serious, in particular the practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, 
forced labor, including forced portering for the military, abuse of women, politically 
motivated arrests and detention, forced displacement of the population, the existence of 
important restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
expression and association, and the imposition of oppressive measures directed, in 
particular, at minority groups” (OHCHR 1994, 1).  
 
                                                
5 See http://ap.ohchr.org/Documents/gmainec.aspx (accessed Oct 14, 2016). 
6 For details on authoritarianism in Myanmar see Dukalskis (2009). 
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In 1996, exerting further pressure on the country’s leaders, the Commission stressed that it 
“strongly urges the Government of Myanmar to guarantee full respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” (OHCHR 1996, 2). A range of foreign investors such as Liz Claiborne, 
Eddie Bauer, Macy’s, and oil company Texaco subsequently withdrew their investment (Spar 
1998). 
But why did the MNCs disinvest, and how can UNHRCC resolutions affect foreign 
investors' behavior in general? At the core of our answer lies firm risk. With the rise of 
globalization, firms have encountered new investment possibilities, but they are also subject to a 
greater range of risks and vulnerabilities which introduce uncertainty. Firms now have to manage 
a variety of economic, political and social risks when they invest in the global marketplace (e.g. 
Schneider and Frey 1985, Kytle and Ruggie 2005). When a host state is publicly condemned by 
the UNHRCC, foreign investors doing business in that country may be exposed to a rise in 
location-related risks. Based on such theories of corporate risk, we propose two main causal 
pathways which we label (1) ‘outcast’ effect and (2) ‘bottleneck’ effect; we believe that these 
two are aggravated by (3) conditioning media effects. We also propose that UNHRCC 
condemnations outweigh potential (4) human rights concerns by MNCs. 
 
(1) ‘Outcast’ effect and political risk 
The first pathway between the UNHRCC and FDI is that its resolutions signal that a state is an 
outcast, unable to secure alliances within the UN human rights bodies that protect it from being 
publicly shamed. This can have negative consequences for investment attractiveness (‘outcast’ 
effect). When a state is publicly condemned by the community of norm-conforming states, a 
political risk arises which can influence strategic concerns of firms about government relations 
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and geo-politics (Kytle and Ruggie 2005).  
 There has been some debate about the motivations behind UNHRCC decisions. In an 
ideal case, UNHRCC members decide to shun a repressive regime purely based on its human 
rights record in a “transparent, fair and impartial” (United Nations 2006, 4) way. However, 
criticism of the Commission as it was founded in 1946 and acted until 2006, has pointed to 
political bias and dynamics7 behind the scenes that come into play. Lebovic and Voeten (2006) 
have examined voting patterns within the Commission between 1997 and 2001, and found that 
partisan ties, power politics and membership influenced voting decisions. For example, Western 
democracies were unwilling to condemn their political allies. Powerful states such as China 
managed to avoid condemnations, while weaker countries like Myanmar failed to gain support 
among the members. Hug (2016) also found that both the Commission and the later Council 
were subject to politicized and polarized decision making. If the voting decisions are influenced 
by such political dynamics, some states may be condemned because they have committed gross 
rights violations, but also – and crucially for this study – because they were unable to form 
strong alliances to protect themselves from public shaming via the UNHRCC. As a consequence, 
the outcome of a UNHRCC condemnation is that the target state is seen as an outcast with no or 
weak alliances in the international community. This could signify damaged bilateral relations 
with other states or a lack of power to gain support in intergovernmental (financial) bodies.  
 Investing in politically isolated states can bear a range of risks and costs for foreign 
investors. Often, governments interact with each other by facilitating economic opportunities on 
the bilateral level and in intergovernmental bodies such as the World Bank, be it via business 
events or official bilateral trade and investment agreements. These diplomatic processes may be 
                                                
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in the direction of political dynamics in the UNHRCC. 
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disrupted when a state is isolated. Therefore, the lack of support by allies in the UNHRCC may 
well be a signal for a loss of general support and functioning economic relations with other 
states.  
 Research has shown the economic costs of being targeted by the UNHRCC. There is 
evidence that after a UNHRCC resolution aid by international economic institutions such as the 
World Bank is reduced (Lebovic and Voeten 2009).8 Lebovic and Voeten (2009) state that the 
shamed states had become political outcasts in the international community and therefore “‘safe 
targets’ for material and non-material sanctions by other institutions” (p. 80).  Similarly, Esarey 
and DeMeritt (2016) show that UNHRCC condemnations are associated with lower bilateral aid 
for states when they previously received small aid packages. There could be consequences for 
FDI as well. In the case of Myanmar, UNHRCC condemnations were followed by U.S. 
regulation in 1997 that prohibited new investment in this particular host country by U.S. 
companies; at this point, many MNCs had already disinvested. 
 The outcast status signaled by UNHRCC voting decisions therefore may explain why 
investment in such a state can pose a political risk for MNCs, which quickly can become an 
economic one, leading to a loss of FDI. This causal pathway, which we label ‘outcast’ effect, is 
distinct from NGO shaming. 
 
Hypothesis 1: UNHRCC condemnations are negatively connected to FDI inflows. 
 
(2) ‘Bottleneck’ effect and social risk 
A UNHRCC resolution signals that a state is one of the most rogue, severe human rights 
                                                
8 Their analysis also showed that UNCHR resolutions have no impact on bilateral aid.  
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violators. Voting members may be aware of many human rights violations, but they pass 
resolutions only in the harshest cases (‘bottleneck’ effect). Any MNC associated with such a 
country risks severe reputational damage.  
When a government is publicly shamed for human rights violations, a social risk is 
created because firms that invest in this state are often criticized publicly and may suffer 
reputational damage (Spar 1998, Barry et al. 2013). Even though it is the state itself that is 
condemned by the UNHRCC, and not the foreign investor itself, the line between the two is 
often blurred. Firms may be seen as directly complicit in state violence (Wettstein 2010), as in 
the case of Nigeria where security forces allegedly arrested and killed anti-oil protesters while 
international investors stood by (Holzer 2007); often MNCs are also criticized for indirectly 
financing a repressive regime (Meyer 1998). Answering to such criticism, multinational 
corporations increasingly portray themselves as concerned about human rights, labor standards 
or corrupt practices by signing up to international initiatives and voluntary standards such as the 
United Nations Global Compact, the Global Reporting Initiative, or ISO 26000. This means that 
firms can be – and are – held accountable for ignoring human rights abuse in host countries. 
Therefore, being connected to a state that is shamed by the UNHRCC can tarnish the brand name 
of a MNC by extending the negative spotlight (Spar 1998) from the host government to the 
investors as well. Extending concepts about economic and political firm risks, pressures by civil 
society and stakeholders have been described as social risks for firms (Kytle and Ruggie 2005) 
that may influence or even outweigh economic advantages of investing abroad, and ultimately 
deter FDI. 
Evidence that firms react to shaming and social risks has been provided by Barry et al. 
(2013) in the context of NGOs. More NGO criticism of repressive regimes is connected to lower 
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FDI inflows in these countries due to potential reputational damage (Barry et al. 2013). We 
expect even stronger effects from UNHRCC resolutions, because UNHRCC decisions undergo 
intense deliberation by voting member states who would pass a resolution only in the most 
severe cases of abuse. Allegations have to be picked up by the UNHRCC in the first place; then 
they have to pass three stages of deliberations – some of which behind closed doors – until they 
reach the resolution stage. This filtering process makes the UNHRCC a unique bottleneck.  
In comparison, NGOs take action in a much wider number of cases. Being aware of the 
additional pressure that can be leveraged via the UNHRCC, they inform and lobby the human 
rights body to deliberate sanctions. In fact, the ‘spiral model’ of human rights norm diffusion 
(Risse and Sikkink 1999) explains that a crucial step for overall shaming success is the ability of 
activists to engage external state and non-state actors, including intergovernmental organizations. 
For example, effects of NGO shaming on repressive regimes’ human rights record have been 
shown to be effective in themselves; but more so when foreign governments criticized abusive 
states from the outside as well (Murdie 2009, Franklin 2008). 
Social risk for foreign investors from UNHRCC resolutions therefore differs from NGO 
shaming in that the UNHRCC is an intergovernmental body with international legitimacy, which 
condemns and flags up the harshest cases of rights violations. The UNHRCC may be able to 
create much larger reputational damage for firms investing in rogue states. We therefore propose 
that the effect of UNHRCC resolutions on FDI is stronger than that of NGO shaming; and it is 
stronger than the milder forms of sanctions within the UNHRCC (‘bottleneck effect’): 
Hypothesis 2a: The effect from UNHRCC condemnations and of NGO shaming on 
FDI is negative; but UNHRCC effects are stronger than those of NGO shaming. 
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Hypothesis 2b: The effect from UNHRCC milder forms of sanctions is less severe 
than from UNHRCC resolutions. 
 
(3) ‘Media effects’ and aggravation of the pathways 
Finally, we believe that the ‘outcast’ and the ‘bottleneck’ effects are aggravated by the media and 
their reports about human rights violations. The media can cement an outcast position of a state 
by reporting about its human rights violations; the media can also amplify reputational damage, 
in particular for those most severe cases that pass the bottleneck of the UNHRCC.  
 The media function as agenda setters, bring human rights violations to the public’s 
attention, and can affect policy decision making (Livingston 1997). International media 
scrutinize governments’ human rights violations (Ramos, Ron and Thoms 2007) by creating 
human stories, be it on the front pages of newspapers or in news broadcasting. With their 
attention, the media can reinforce effects of UNHRCC condemnations, reaching the public and 
investors alike (Pruce and Budabin 2016, Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
 For example, in the case of Myanmar, the New York Times repeatedly reported about 
business’ involvement in the repressive regime. In December 1996, following a resolution by the 
UN Commission on Human Rights in April that year, the newspaper shamed the government in 
an article titled “Doing Business in Myanmar”, 
“For sheer nastiness, few governments can compete with Myanmar’s. It winks at heroin 
trafficking. It forces citizens to provide slave labor to build bridges and railroads. In 1990 
the Government lost elections, then imprisoned and harassed activists of the victorious 
party, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Last week the Government confined her to her 
house, detained more of her colleagues and shut down secondary schools to stop student 
protests.” (NYT 1996, A14). 
 
The newspaper also criticized foreign investors which provide capital to the regime, such 
as the California-based energy company Unocal: “at times a government is so repressive and a 
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company’s support of it so significant that its presence cannot help but be political… Unocal 
should not be doing business there.” The article praised that Macy’s and Disney disinvested, as a 
response to publicity. Unocal itself did not immediately follow - in fact, it was called a 
“shameful exception” (NYT 1997, A36). Other multinationals such as Philipps, J. Crew and 
Texaco soon withdrew to avoid the bad press. In 1997, the U.S. Congress and Clinton 
administration approved sanctions against Myanmar, preventing U.S. companies from making 
new investments in the country. Even if a business is not directly involved in human rights 
violations or has little influence on a government’s actions, consumers may still hold it 
accountable for non-action when the media pick up on human rights violations and shape the 
public discourse (Holzer 2007).  
 There is some evidence on the power of the media in the context of human rights. Peksen 
et al. (2014) find that news media coverage of human rights violations increases the likelihood of 
U.S. economic sanctions against abusive governments. Nielsen (2013) finds a negative 
relationship between media reports of human rights violations and aid for economic sectors.9 In 
their study on NGO shaming and FDI, Barry et al. (2013) point out that NGOs aim to publicize 
human rights violations via media outlets to apply further pressure and maximize impact. To 
capture this effect, Barry et al. (2013) merge NGO activism and media influence into one 
variable: NGO criticism of rights violations as reported by Reuters (see also Peterson et al. 
2016). Due to the nature of the outcast effect and the bottleneck effect, we treat the media as a 
separate measure and explicitly model media reports about human rights violations in a country 
(not just reports about UNHRCC violations; as this would be too narrow) as an amplifier by 
                                                
9 Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that media reports have no significant effect on political rights and physical integrity 
rights. It could be that the media alone may not have such effects, but that they work in interaction with other 
shaming measures such as our UN resolution measure, which we will test later in relation to FDI inflows. 
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entering it as a conditioning factor into our models. In doing that, we follow Garriga (2016) who 
has examined the effects of international human rights treaties conditioned by the media. The 
rationale behind this is that the original influence of UNHRCC is important in its own right; but 
when general public criticism is amplified by the media, the effect is expected to be stronger.   
 
Hypothesis 3: Effects of UNHRCC condemnations are conditional on 
international media reporting about human rights violations. 
 
(4) ‘Human rights concerns’ by MNCs 
 
Finally, it could also be true that MNCs care about the human rights record of a country itself, 
rather than reacting to UNHRCC condemnations and the pathways laid out above. Previous work 
has connected a worse human rights record to less FDI (Blanton and Blanton 2006, 2007b, 
2009), indicating that companies do, on the whole, not want to invest in repressive regimes. It is 
not clear if firms are actually concerned about human rights, or shaming, or other issues 
connected to human rights abuse. Many critics state that much of the human rights promises in 
corporate social responsibility reports are a form of ‘green-washing’ and ‘window-dressing’, 
rather than being a real concern (Christian Aid, 2004; Frankental, 2001). The relationship 
between human rights and FDI loss may also be due to an aversion to political and economic 
instability (Khan and Akbar 2013, Vadlamannati 2012, Blanton and Blanton, 2007a, Davenport 
et al. 2006), concerns about human capital provision (Blanton and Blanton 2009), or fear of 
inadequate property rights protection (Barry et al. 2013) – which may be connected to a worse 
human rights record of a country. The link between shaming and FDI is much more tangible and 
direct. We therefore propose that effects from UNHRCC resolutions are stronger than those of 
the human rights record of a regime itself: 
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Hypothesis 4: Human rights abuse itself is negatively connected to FDI 
inflows, but the effect of UNHRCC condemnations is stronger.  
	
 
Methods and Data 
Model Specifications 
 To examine the hypotheses, we apply panel data covering 164 countries (see Appendix 1 
for list of countries) over the 1977–2013 (37 years) period. Since some of the data are not 
available for all country-years, the dataset is unbalanced. We estimate: 
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 Wherein, itfdiln is our outcome variable FDI inflows, ϕ is the intercept, Hit-1 are our key 
variables of interest: human rights shaming via UNHRCC condemnations; human rights abuse 
itself; shaming by human rights NGOs. Zit-1 are control variables, λt is time dummies, ηi is 
country dummies, and ωit is the error term.  
We measure the total FDI inflows ( itfdiln ) a country i received in year t measured in 
US$ millions current prices, from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD 2015). 10  Due to skewness we employ a logarithmic transformation of the FDI 
variable. Since some observations are negative (divestments by foreign investors), 11 : and 
logging negative values is impossible, we follow Busse and Nunnenkamp (2010) for log 
transformation, which has also been applied by others (e.g. Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006): 
                                                
10 The UNCTAD defines FDI as long-term cross-country investments consisting of at least 10% ownership and 
voting power by the foreign party. 
11 Simply deleting negative values would result in losing at least 8% of the total observations, which might bias our 
results.	
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 Hit-1 captures our three key variables of interest which are lagged by one year as we 
believe that their effects on FDI are not contemporaneous. The first variable is human rights 
shaming via UNHRCC condemnations. We use two different operationalizations of UNHRCC 
condemnations. First, we use a dummy measure with the value 1 in year t-1 if country i is 
condemned by the UNHRCC by adopting a public resolution and 0 otherwise.12 The data on 
public resolutions adopted by the then Commission until 2000 is obtained from Lebovic and 
Voeten (2006) who cover the years from 1976 to 2000. From 2001 onwards, we update these 
codings with the same criteria, using the information about adopted resolutions from the former 
Commission13 and later Council14 until 2013.15 Figure 1 captures the trend of UNHRCC public 
resolutions and FDI inflows (mean) 1977 to 201316, showing higher FDI inflows where 
UNHRCC condemnations are reduced. FDI inflows overall have dramatically increased since the 
mid-1990s which can be attributed to fall of the Soviet Union and most of the countries now 
welcoming FDI inflows. With respect to UNHRCC condemnations, there was an increasing 
trend of adopting resolutions during the 1970s and 1980s, and the mean of public resolutions 
peaked in the early 1990s through the mid-1990s. This could be attributed to the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the human rights violations followed in the early years in many of the new 
                                                
12 Note that our results are robust to alternative lag structures on condemnations. 
13 This information is available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/previous-sessions.htm (accessed Dec 1, 
2016). 
14  These documents are available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Documents.aspx (accessed 
Dec 1, 2016). 
15 These are there all practically from the same source and represent resolutions from the UNHRCC. 
16 With this wide range of years, we go beyond the only comparable analysis on (NGO) shaming and FDI by Barry 
et al. 2013, which covers 10 years (1994-2004).	
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post-Soviet countries. There is a declining trend with the advent of the new Council in 2006, 
suggesting that the new body’s approach remains cautious.  
 Further, we also make use of a finer-grained measure of the severity of UNHRCC 
targeting, in which we use a decomposed measure, i.e., a series of dummies corresponding to 
each category of UNHRCC shaming process namely, (i) targeting a country with no further 
subsequent action; (ii) confidential report or internal condemnations; (iii) critical statement but 
short of adopting a public resolution; and (iv) public resolution, so as not to assume linearity in 
the effects from one degree of severity to the other. This approach ensures that we examine 
UNHRCC public resolutions (with the harshest cases, acting as a bottleneck), but also capture 
potential effects from milder sanctions in comparison. 
 Our second key variable of interest is human rights abuse itself. We use the Political 
Terror Scale (PTS) index developed by Gibney et al. (2012), which measures the amount of 
respect a state gives to personal integrity rights such as the freedom from politically motivated 
execution, torture, forced disappearance, unlawful imprisonment and discrimination based on 
political and religious beliefs. The PTS index is made up of two components. One based on a 
codification of country information from Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports to 
a scale from 1 (being the best) to 5 (being worst) human rights score. The other is coded from 
information from the US Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
again coded on a 1-5 scale. We take the average of these two measures to avoid any subjective 
biases, especially the data from the U.S. State Department (Qian and Yanagizawa 2009, Poe et 
al. 2001).17 This index is a commonly accepted measure for human rights protection and has 
been used widely in the literature (Walker and Poe 2002). We also use an alternative measure of 
                                                
17 PTS Amnesty score + PTS State Department, divided by two. For a detailed description on methodology, see: 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/ (accessed Dec 1, 2016). 
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the PTS index in which we decompose the variable into its constituent categories, i.e., a series of 
dummies corresponding to each of the PTS scores.18   
 Our third key variable is shaming by human rights NGOs, taken from Peterson, Murdie 
and Asal (2016), who have updated this variable originally from Murdie and Davis (2012). NGO 
shaming captures the annual count of shaming incidents reported, targeting a particular regime or 
government, as reflected in Reuters Global News Service reports (see also Barry et al. 2013). In 
order to overcome the problem of skewness in the data, the authors log the count variable 
(adding one in the cases on zero values). We should note that the main limitation of this NGO 
shaming measure is that the data is available only from 1990 onwards, reducing our sample 
considerably for the respective models, and therefore the results must be interpreted with 
caution.  
 With respect to the control variables (Zit-1), we follow other studies on determinants of 
FDI such as Blonigen and Piger (2014), Jakobsen and de Soysa (2006), Jensen (2003), Busse 
(2003), Chakrabarti (2001). We are conscious of the potential traps of “garbage can model” 
(Achen 2005) or “kitchen sink model” (Schrodt 2010) in which numerous variables are dumped 
onto the right hand side of the equation. Thus, we follow a conservative strategy of accounting 
only for known factors that may confound the effects. Accordingly, we include GDP per capita, 
measured in 2000 US$ constant prices (logged) as a proxy for the level of development in the 
host country, expecting that richer countries are more likely to attract FDI.19 We also include a 
measure of economic growth using the rate of growth of GDP sourced from the World 
Development Indicators 2015. Likewise, we include total population (log) as a proxy for the 
                                                
18 The dummy for PTS index score 1 is our reference category 
19 Alternatively, high levels of economic development can also influence FDI due to high labour cost (Walsh and Yu 
2010).	
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market size of an economy. As a measure of infrastructure, we use total electricity consumption 
in kilowatts per head (log) sourced from the global energy dataset developed by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). Electricity consumption not only captures the availability of 
electricity, but also the cost associated in accessing electricity20 (Vadlamannati 2012, Bilgili et 
al. 2012). Furthermore, we include a dummy indicating whether a country has experienced all or 
one of three crises and economic instabilities: currency crisis, debt crisis, and systemic banking 
crisis sourced from Laeven and Valencia (2013).21 Following Robertson and Teitelbaum 2011, 
we control for regime type using the Polity IV index developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2002), 
varying from -10 to +10, where a higher score denotes a higher level of democracy.22 Previous 
studies find that investor confidence is likely to be higher for democratic regimes (Jensen 2006, 
Li and Resnick 2003). We also include a measure of trade openness (exports + imports relative 
to GDP) (log) from the World Bank (2015). Trade openness is a proxy for trade restrictions 
(Brazys 2014) that might influence FDI activity in the recipient country (Asiedu 2002). We also 
include a measure of conflict (international and domestic), which typically threatens the physical 
property of investors and also a government’s capacity to maintain law and order (Jakobsen and 
de Soysa 2006). The conflict dummy is 1 if there is conflict with at least 25 deaths in a single 
year and 0 otherwise, taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
Finally, in line with previous work we include a lagged dependent variable (LDV, hereafter), i.e., 
FDI inflowsit-1. The inclusion of a LDV can cause inconsistent estimations in a panel data 
analysis with fixed effects resulting in a downward bias for the coefficient, known to be ‘Nickell 
                                                
20 Energy cost is first identified by Dunning (1988) as a major location specific advantage for the host country to 
attract FDI. 
21Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) find that excessive levels of external debt and a threat of default have 
significant negative influence on investor perception. 
22 In robustness checks we replace Polity IV measure with freedom house measure on civil and political liberties 
index. Our results are robust to use freedom house measure.	
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bias’ (Nickell 1981). Thus, we also present results where we replace the LDV with FDI inward 
stock (t-1) in US$ millions (UNCTAD 2015) as a gauge of the host country's existing FDI 
position.23  
We estimate all models with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator with 
heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors, controlling for time ( tl ) and country fixed 
effects ( ih ). We lag all controls by one year to allow the effect to spread.
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Interaction Effects 
Next, we will examine whether the negative effect of UNHRCC public condemnations is 
conditional on media reporting about human rights abuses, introducing interaction terms: 
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Wherein, 1)( -´ itmediaH is the interaction term, lagged by one year and 1-itmedia is the 
conditioning variable namely, event count of media reports on human rights abuses developed by 
Nielsen (2013). The dataset was constructed by Nielsen (2013) by evaluating all articles that 
appeared in The New York Times (NYT) containing mentions of countries and their human rights 
violations (1977-2004). Nielsen (2013) and Bell, Frank and Macharia (2013) argue that the 
newspaper’s presence in most of the countries around the world, and accessibility of information, 
were the key reasons in selecting the NYT as a proxy for ‘international media’. Bell et al. (2013) 
note that in the absence of the newspaper’s presence in a country, it sources information from 
                                                
23 We thank the referee for suggesting this point. 
24 Descriptive statistics on all variables are in Appendix 2; definitions and data sources in Appendix 3. 
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news agencies such as the Associated Press, United Press International, Agence France Presse, 
Reuters, or others.25 We believe that because of the coverage, accessibility, market presence, and 
readership, The New York Times measure is a good proxy for the media coverage on human 
rights stories. 26  Nielsen (2013) focused on articles which used the phrase human rights 
specifically related to physical integrity rights (torture, disappearances, extra judiciary killings 
and illegal detentions) within 25 words of country name i in year t. We extend this event count 
data following the same procedure until 2013. The average coverage is about seven reporting 
events per country with a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 327 events (reported 
from China). There is a lot of variation in the data distribution. For instance, 95% of the 
reporting events are 60 or less, and the majority of cases fall between 0 and 40. We thus use two 
different operationalizations of NYT variable: (1) We log the media reports to address skewness; 
(2) We exclude data points above 60 media reports, which is roughly 5% of the total data. As 
before, we control for time fixed effects and country fixed effects in all our interaction models.  
 
Results 
Tables 1-3 present our regression results. Table 1 displays results estimated using OLS two-way 
fixed effects models examining the relationship between UNHRCC condemnations, human 
rights abuse and FDI inflows, controlling for other key determinants of FDI. Table 2 presents the 
                                                
25 Bell et al. (2013) also provide examples as to how non-Western newspapers in turn use NYT as a source to gather 
information to publish articles, thereby disseminating the newspaper’s stories and widening its audience and 
influence. Furthermore, The New York Times International Edition which was previously known as International 
Herald Tribune has 26 Foreign news bureaus and is sold in as many as 160 countries around the world (nytoco.com 
2010). 
26 However, as one of the limitation of this measure could be seen that it is still just one newspaper. Ideally, one 
would code news coverage from all major newspapers in the world, but it is practically impossible to construct such 
a dataset. Therefore, following Burgoon (2015), Garriga (2016), and Bell, Frank and Macharia (2013), who also use 
the Nielsen (2013) data, we use the New York Time as a crude proxy for international media coverage on human 
rights events. 
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results on the decomposed measure of the PTS index and UNHRCC shaming effects on FDI 
inflows. Table 3 reports the interactions with media reporting.  
 As seen in column 1 in Table 1, the impact of public condemnations by the UNHRCC on 
FDI inflows is negative and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The substantial 
effects suggest that countries condemned by the UNHRCC are associated with a roughly 49% 
decline in FDI inflows. We find the results to be robust even after including a LDV in column 2 
and controlling for lagged FDI inward stock in column 3. These results lend support to our first 
hypothesis that the UNHRCC condemnations are negatively connected to FDI inflows. Notice 
that human rights abuse in itself has a negative effect on FDI inflows (as in column 1, Table 1) 
but the substantive effect is weaker than effects from human rights shaming by the UNHRCC. 
For instance, a standard deviation increase in the PTS index above the mean is associated with a 
15% decline in FDI inflows (5% significance level). Interestingly, when we include a LDV in 
column 2, we find that negative effects of UNHRCC condemnations on FDI inflows remain 
robust while the effect of human rights abuse itself becomes insignificant. These results suggest 
that shaming by the UNHRCC is a major driver of the negative effects on FDI reported in Table 
1, possibly because of the high visibility of condemnations by an international body like the UN 
and the connected harsh pressure of resolutions on business reputation (bottleneck effect) as well 
as effects from isolation of the host county in the international community (outcast effect). 
Human rights abuse is a much less strong predictor of investment decisions, supporting our 
hypothesis 4 that though human rights abuse itself is negatively connected to FDI inflows, but 
the effect of UNHRCC condemnations is stronger. 
 Next, as seen from column 4, we do not find a significant effect of NGO shaming on FDI 
inflows, while the impact of UNHRCC shaming on FDI inflows retains a negative sign (10% 
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level). Public condemnations by the UNHRCC are associated with a 47% decline in FDI 
suggesting that NGO activism can work through creating additional pressure that can be 
leveraged via the UNHRCC. These results support our Hypothesis 2a that the effect from 
UNHRCC condemnations is stronger than that of NGO shaming.  
In columns 5-7 we report the results on the finer-grained measure of the severity of 
UNHRCC shaming process. The UNHRCC shaming process has to pass three stages of 
deliberations and milder sanctions until they reach the resolution stage. Neither of the mild 
sanctions have effects on FDI. Only the final stage, public resolution, is significantly different 
from zero (5% level), suggesting that foreign investors pay more attention to UN scrutiny when 
the regime is publicly condemned via a resolution that has passed the bottleneck of milder 
sanctions, thus creating negative consequences for investment attractiveness. These results 
remain robust when we include a LDV in column 6 and a lagged FDI inward stock measure in 
column 7. These results are in line with our Hypothesis 2b that the effect of milder UNHRCC 
sanctions is less severe than the effect of public resolutions, possibly because some of the milder 
sanctions are issued behind closed doors.  
With respect to the control variables, regime type, the GDP growth rate and trade 
openness are connected to higher FDI inflows.27 Population and infrastructure, though initially 
significant, lose their significance when including a LDV. Overall, our findings on UNHRCC 
condemnations remain robust to the inclusion of a range of control variables. 
 In Table 2 we report the findings employing decomposed measures of the PTS index and 
UNHRCC shaming. Note that in column 3, we also include the NGO shaming measure. We do 
                                                
27 Increasing the regime type (democracy) index by a standard deviation above the mean increases the average 
impact on FDI inflows by roughly 44%. Also, the substantial effects of the GDP growth rate on FDI inflows is 
positive and about 15%. Similarly, a standard deviation above the mean of trade openness (log) is associated with a 
roughly 38% increase in FDI inflows. 
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not find statistical significance for any of the constituent categories on FDI inflows. The 
UNHRCC condemnations coefficient remains negative and significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level. After controlling for the disaggregated PTS dummies, UNHRCC condemnations 
are associated with a 35% decline in FDI inflows (column 1). Our results remain robust to the 
inclusion of a LDV in column 1 and a lagged measure of FDI inward stock in column 2. NGO 
shaming (column 3), remains statistically insignificant. Columns 4-6 include a decomposed 
measure of the severity of UNHRCC shaming. As seen, none of the constituent categories of 
PTS dummies nor the decomposed measures of UNHRCC shaming explain FDI inflows. The 
sole exception is the UNHRCC public resolution of condemnation which is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Notice that these results remain robust to the 
inclusion of a LDV and lagged FDI inward stock measures reported in column 4 and 5. Once 
again, the NGO shaming measure remains statistically insignificant (as reported in column 6). 
Overall, these results lend support to our theoretical arguments that the UNHRCC public 
condemnations effects are stronger than those of milder sanctions imposed by the body, human 
rights abuse itself and NGO shaming, although we are more cautious about models including the 
NGO variable due to a reduced sample size. The results on the control variables in Table 2 are in 
line with the findings of others (Blonigen and Piger 2014, Chakrabarti 2001) and those reported 
in Table 1. 
 
 Conditional Effects 
Thus far, we presented the direct effect of human rights abuse and human rights shaming by the 
UNHRCC on FDI inflows. Next, we examine whether the negative effects of human rights 
shaming by the UNHRCC on FDI are conditional on the level of media reporting on human 
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rights (corresponding to hypothesis 3). We introduce interaction terms between UNHRCC 
condemnations and international media reporting on human rights violations (Table 3). The first 
two columns in Table 3 report these interaction effects. In the last two columns, we present the 
findings on the interaction effects between the UNHRCC condemnations and media reports with 
60 or less news reporting events. Columns 2 and 4 also include a LDV. The interaction term in 
column 1 is negative and significantly different from zero at the 10% level suggesting that the 
negative impact of UNCHRCC condemnations on FDI inflows is more pronounced when 
accompanied by media reporting on human rights abuses. Importantly, however, the UNHRCC 
condemnations coefficient on its own, i.e., when media reporting is set to 0, has no effect on FDI 
inflows. Likewise, the effect of media reports when the UNHRCC dummy is 0 on FDI is also 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that the effect on UNHRCC condemnations is 
conditional upon media reporting. It is noteworthy that even in linear models the change in 
statistical significance of the interactive term depends on the conditioning variable (i.e. measure 
on media reporting). We therefore rely on conditional plots shown in Figure 2 for the results 
shown in column 1 in Table 3. To calculate the marginal effect of UNHRCC condemnations, we 
take account of both the conditioning variable (i.e. log media reporting) and the interaction term. 
The y-axis of Figure 2 shows the marginal effect of UNHRCC dummy, and on the x-axis the 
level of (log) media reports on human rights at which the marginal effect is evaluated; we 
include the 90% confidence interval as well. In line with our results of the OLS estimation, the 
UNHRCC condemnations dummy would decrease FDI inflows (at the 90% confidence level at 
least) when the number of human rights abuse events reported by the media is greater than 20 
(significant at the 5% level). The conditional plot shows that at zero events (i.e. when there are 
no media reports on human rights abuse), the impact of UNHRCC condemnations on FDI 
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inflows remains statistically insignificant. However, at the maximum value of media reporting 
events on human rights abuse (which is about 330) the negative impact of the PTS index on FDI 
inflows is about 145%, which is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. It is noteworthy 
that these results uphold in column 2 when we control for a LDV. 
 We now turn to the conditional effect of UNHRCC condemnations and media reporting 
excluding outliers with less than 60 reporting events presented in column 3-4 in Table 3. As 
seen, the interaction term is also negative and significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
in column 4 suggesting that the negative impact of UNCHRCC condemnations on FDI inflows is 
more pronounced when accompanied by media reporting (less than 60 events) on human rights 
abuses. Once again, we rely on the conditional plot in Figure 3. The y-axis of Figure 3 shows the 
marginal effect of UNHRCC public condemnations, and on the x-axis the level of media reports 
with less than 60 reporting events on human rights at which the marginal effect is evaluated. A 
UNHRCC public condemnation incident would decrease the FDI inflows (at the 90% confidence 
level at least) when the number of human rights abuse events reported by the media is greater 
than 20, which is roughly the 90th percentile of the total media reports. For instance, at 20 media 
reports on human rights abuse, the impact of UNHRCC condemnations is associated with an 
about 41% decline in FDI inflows, which is significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
Likewise, a UNHRCC resolution leads to an 86% decline in FDI inflows if accompanied by at 
least 40 media reports on human rights abuse, which is significantly different from zero at the 
5% level. The effects are similar when estimating the interactions by including a LDV reported 
in column 4. Our results thus support Hypothesis 3 that the impact of UNHRCC condemnations 
on FDI is also conditional on media reporting about human rights violations.  
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Checks for Robustness 
We examine the robustness of our main findings in several ways (all robustness tables reported 
in our supplementary files). First, we control for the following variables: natural resource rents as 
a share of GDP, life expectancy, ICRG's law and order index which is a proxy for property rights 
(Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006), and, following Garriga (2016), a dummy measure capturing 
whether a country has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Our results (Table 1A-1C) on UNHRCC condemnations along with the interaction effects remain 
robust. Second, following Dreher and Gassebner (2008), we exclude the observations with 
extreme values reported in the FDI inflows data. Our baseline results reported earlier are 
qualitatively unchanged (Table 2A-2C). Third, following Lebovic and Voeten (2006) we 
estimate the models separately for the sample covering the post-Cold War period (1990-2013) 
because the UNHR Commission was may have been influenced by cold war politics in which 
some member countries were split into Soviet and the US camps (Donnelly 1988). The effect of 
UNHRCC condemnations on FDI inflows in the post-Cold war period is roughly five times that 
of the human rights abuse itself (Table 3A-3C). Our results remain robust to including the 
interaction effects. Fourth, as discussed earlier, the then UNHR Commission was replaced by a 
new body, i.e., Council, which began operating in 2006. While main analysis includes both 
institutions, we now split the post-2006 years from the. The results (Table 4A-4B) broadly 
corroborate our earlier findings. Fifth, we acknowledge that endogeneity can stem from omitted 
variable bias. It is plausible that the UNHRCC is indeed responding to the human rights events 
highlighted by certain human rights NGOs. We control for a variable measuring NGO shaming 
in our models. However, the data is available only from 1990 onwards, reducing our sample size. 
As an alternative, we now control for the total number of local and international NGOs (log) in 
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our robustness check models. Our results (Table 5A-5C) remain robust. Sixth, the impact of the 
UNHRCC condemnations on FDI might be influenced by selection bias because targeting a 
country for condemnation by the UNHRCC is not a random event. Countries are (partially) 
screened based on their performance on human rights. The potential problem of unobserved 
heterogeneity could result in the error term in the equation of the FDI inflows being correlated 
with some explanatory variables that determine public condemnations. We therefore use a binary 
treatment regression estimator to control for selection effects.28 This estimator takes account of 
the determinants of a UNHRCC condemnations in the first step which is the non-random 
treatment assignment, and models it in non-linear specification in the second step. The non-linear 
prediction equation for UNHRCC condemnations and the linear estimation of FDI inflow 
determinants are estimated simultaneously.29 Our results reported in (Table 6A) do not change 
and remain robust. While, in line with Lebovic and Voeten (2006) we find that in countries 
which are targets of UNHRCC, human rights violations, income, regime type, trade openness 
and conflict, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ratification and 
UNHRCC membership are strong determinants of UNHRCC condemnations. Seventh, we 
estimate our baseline models by replacing the LDV with a measure of the (log) global volume of 
FDI (minus ith country) during the given year which accounts for broad temporal trends in FDI 
that affect all potential host countries equally.30 Note that we also drop time fixed effects but 
retain country fixed effects when controlling for global FDI. Our results (Table 7A) do not 
change.  
                                                
28 We make use of the etreg command in STATA 13 to estimate treatment regression models. 
29 Note that in the two-step treatment regression specification estimating the probability of a country i facing 
UNHRCC condemnation in year t in the first step which is a non-linear specification, we control for time fixed 
effects and in the second step on FDI inflows, which is a linear specification, we control for both country and time 
fixed effects. 
30 We thank the referee for suggesting this option. 
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Next, we replace the Polity regime type index with Freedom House's measure on civil 
and political liberties which is coded on 1-7 scale, wherein higher value denotes more protection 
of civil and political liberties and a more democratic system. Our results (Table 8A-8B) remain 
robust when we replace Polity measure with Freedom House index. Finally, we address the 
endogeneity concerns related to the impact of human rights abuse (using the PTS index) and FDI 
inflows (Table 9A-9C). We introduce a two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV 
hereafter) estimations approach with time and country specific fixed effects. We use two 
instrumental variables. First, PTS index global context is the average score of the PTS index in 
the other countries minus the ith country in question. Second, PTS index regional context is the 
average score of the PTS index in that particular geographic region (minus the ith country in 
question) to which country i belongs.31 These instruments, we believe, are likely to be correlated 
to human rights practices in country i, but may not be correlated with the FDI inflows in country 
i. There is evidence that human rights practices tend to diffuse across borders. For instance, 
Greig et al. (2006) finds geography to be an important link in spreading both political repression 
and respect for human rights. Greig et al. (2007) show that states tend to become more repressive 
in nature if the geographic region is concentrated with human rights violators and vice versa. We 
extend the argument that states learn from the example of others and geographic proximity 
provides opportunity not only for interaction but also to observe various policy options to select 
from. We expect the state to either repress or respect human rights depending upon how 
neighbouring states in the geographic region behave towards their citizens. We lag our 
instruments by two-years. The two instrumental variables are considered to be valid, if they are 
correlated with the endogenous variable, namely the PTS index. We make use of a joint F-
                                                
31 We follow the World Bank classification of geographic regions viz., Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
Caribbean, Middle East North Africa, North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific.  
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statistic in the first-step regression, suggested by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), on the 
excluded instruments.32 Secondly, the selected two instruments in the second stage equation 
should not vary systematically with our employed disturbance term, i.e. . We know 
of no theoretical arguments linking the human rights performance in neighbouring geographic 
region and across other countries to FDI inflows in the country in question. We apply the Sargan 
test (Sargan 1958) which shows that the null-hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 
conventional level of significance.33 After controlling for endogeneity concerns, we find that the 
PTS index is associated with a decline in FDI inflows.  
Overall, the findings from our robustness checks suggest that our results are robust not 
only to the size of the sample and alternative methods of operationalization of our main variable 
of interest, but also to alternative estimation techniques. 
 
Conclusion 
Our study presented several interesting results with important policy implications.  First, 
foreign investors avoid countries which have been shamed by the UNHRCC for committing 
human rights violations. This result holds across a range of model specifications and robustness 
checks. Previous work has shown that shaming by various state and non-state actors can 
influence human rights practices (e.g. Hafner-Burton 2008, Franklin 2008). One potential 
mechanism which we were interested in was to change state behavior via shaming and economic 
pressures, as the spiral model has proposed (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Supporting findings 
                                                
32 The first-step of the 2SLS-IV estimations are reported in Table 9B in supplementary files. 
33 It is also noteworthy that as an alternative way to test exclusion criteria we also regress FDI inflows (log), our 
dependent variable, on PTS index global context and PTS index regional context after controlling for all the controls 
used in our baseline models reported in Table 10C in supplementary files. Both instruments pass the instrument 
exclusion criteria. In other words, both instruments remain statistically insignificant in explaining FDI inflows. 
34	
by Barry et al. (2013) and Peterson et al. 2016, we provide further evidence that shaming can 
create tangible economic costs for repressive regimes in the form of FDI loss. This effect is 
stronger than effects of human rights abuse itself on FDI.  
Second, while much work in the shaming literature concentrates on NGOs, we shed more 
light on the power and workings of intergovernmental organizations – in particular the 
UNHRCC. We show that UNHRCC resolutions can deter foreign investors from operating in 
targeted countries. While NGOs and other actors have been shown to be effective in their own 
right (Barry et al. 2013), they do well to lobby IGOs to increase pressure on rogue states, as 
proposed by the spiral model. The UNHRCC’s unique and political decision-making process can 
influence investors by signaling that a host country has become an outcast, with weak political 
and economic ties to other states. In addition, only the harshest cases reach the stage of an actual 
UNHRCC resolution, which can bear severe reputational damage not only for the targeted state, 
but also for multinational corporations investing in this country. Our results indicate that the 
effects of the UNHRCC are larger than those of NGOs, although this result is not as robust as 
our other findings. We also show that resolutions, as opposed to lower level sanctions by the 
UNHRCC, have the strongest effect, indicating that resolutions, which have passed the 
bottleneck, are most effective in deterring FDI. With these results, we add to the existing body of 
work on IGOs that has shown the costs of being shamed by the UN human rights bodies in the 
form of loss of multilateral and bilateral aid (Lebovic and Voeten 2009, Esarey and DeMeritt 
2016). For future research, we suggest an examination of FDI disaggregated into industry sectors 
(see Blanton and Blanton 2009, Janz 2017) because that may influence the vulnerability of firms 
to shaming activities. Some industries may rely on a brand image more than others; some 
industries such as resource-seeking sectors are more location-bound, so that the link between 
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shaming and FDI could be weaker. An examination of shaming and FDI across using firm-level 
or industry-level data could therefore provide further insights into the mechanisms and 
conditions under which shaming might influence FDI.  
Third, the findings provide evidence that media reporting about human rights abuse plays 
a crucial role and amplifies the effects of UNHRCC resolutions on FDI. While other studies have 
included the media as separate shaming actors (e.g. Hafner-Burton 2008) or as measures 
integrating NGO shaming and media into one variable (Barry et al. 2013), we demonstrated that 
the amplification of UNHRCC resolutions by media reports is effective in deterring FDI. Future 
research on media effects could use a wider range of media sources and types, and test regional 
effects. We believe that the NYT has international reach and makes for a reasonable proxy for 
media coverage of human rights (Nielsen 2013, Burgoon et al. 2015, Garriga 2016); but there is 
a range of influential newspaper, television, radio and internet media that may be particularly 
powerful in certain regions of the world, and may be received differently by different audiences, 
including firm decision makers. 
There are many other unexplored pathways and refinement opportunities in the human 
rights and FDI literature. For example, the type of human rights violation that is shamed 
(DeMeritt, Conrad and Fariss 2016) may also play a role in deterring FDI, since some rights 
violations may weigh heavier in damaging a firm’s reputation than others, or in isolating a state 
within the international community. Overall, the policy indication of our work is clear: By 
strengthening intergovernmental organizations that comprehensively monitor and condemn 
countries for human rights violations, one might be able to discourage foreign investments 
flowing into repressive regimes. This might encourage such regimes to improve their human 
rights performances.   
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Table 1: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows, 1977-2013 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and  
FDI inflows, 1977-2013 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Conditional effects of UNHRCC condemnations and media reporting, 1977-2013 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Appendix 1:Countries under study 
 
Afghanistan Comoros Haiti Mongolia Slovenia
Albania Congo, Democratic Republic Honduras Morocco Solomon Islands
Algeria Congo, Republic Hungary Mozambique South Africa
Angola Costa Rica India Myanmar South Korea
Argentina Cote d'Ivoire Indonesia Namibia Spain
Armenia Croatia Iran Nepal Sri Lanka
Australia Cuba Iraq Netherlands Sudan
Austria Cyprus Ireland New Zealand Suriname
Azerbaijan Czech Republic Israel Nicaragua Swaziland
Bahrain Denmark Italy Niger Sweden
Bangladesh Djibouti Jamaica Nigeria Switzerland
Barbados Dominican Republic Japan North Korea Syria
Belarus Ecuador Jordan Norway Taiwan
Belgium Egypt Kazakhstan Oman Tajikistan
Belize El Salvador Kenya Pakistan Tanzania
Benin Equatorial Guinea Kuwait Panama Thailand
Bhutan Eritrea Kyrgyz Republic Papua New Guinea Togo
Bolivia Estonia Laos Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago
Botswana Ethiopia Latvia Peru Tunisia
Brazil Fiji Lebanon Philippines Turkey
Brunei Finland Lesotho Poland Turkmenistan
Bulgaria France Liberia Portugal Uganda
Burkina Faso Gabon Libya Qatar Ukraine
Burundi Gambia Lithuania Romania United Arab Emirates
Cambodia Georgia Macedonia Russia United Kingdom
Cameroon Germany Madagascar Rwanda United States of America
Canada Ghana Malawi Sao Tome and Principe Uruguay
Cape Verde Greece Malaysia Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan
Central African Republic Grenada Mali Senegal Venezuela
Chad Guatemala Mauritania Seychelles Vietnam
Chile Guinea Mauritius Sierra Leone Yemen
China Guinea-Bissau Mexico Singapore Zambia
Colombia Guyana Moldova Slovakia Zimbabwe  
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
FDI inflows (log) 5.156 3.845 -11.057 13.350 5640 
Political Terror Scale index 2.479 1.099 1.000 5.000 5676 
Political Terror Scale dummy: 5 0.070 0.255 0.000 1.000 5676 
Political Terror Scale dummy: 4 0.081 0.273 0.000 1.000 5676 
Political Terror Scale dummy: 3 0.180 0.384 0.000 1.000 5676 
Political Terror Scale dummy: 2 0.205 0.404 0.000 1.000 5676 
UNHRCC condemnations 0.057 0.232 0.000 1.000 5785 
UNHRCC target 0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000 5785 
UNHRCC confidential 0.019 0.137 0.000 1.000 5785 
UNHRCC critical statement 0.026 0.160 0.000 1.000 5785 
New York Times reports events (log) 1.538 1.229 0.000 5.790 2628 
NGO Shaming (log) 0.096 0.297 0.000 2.565 3210 
Per capita GDP (log) 7.812 1.618 4.314 11.274 5776 
Polity Democracy index 1.593 7.284 -10.000 10.000 5500 
Economic Crisis 0.064 0.244 0.000 1.000 5909 
GDP Growth rate 3.577 6.602 -66.120 106.280 5780 
Population (log) 15.795 1.761 9.727 21.060 6068 
Trade/GDP (log) 3.956 0.584 1.591 6.894 5736 
Infrastructure (Electricity consumption log) 1.810 2.330 -2.303 8.449 5774 
Conflict 0.171 0.376 0.000 1.000 5829 
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Appendix 3: Data definition and sources 
 
Variables Data definition and sources 
FDI inflows 
Total FDI inflows into country i in year t measured in US$ millions and 
logged. The data is sourced from UNCTAD statistics 2015 
UNHRCC condemnations 
Value 1 if country i in year t is targeted by the UNHRCC for public 
condemnations by adopting a resolution and 0 otherwise 
PTS index 
 
Coded on 1-5 scale wherein 1 means proper rule of law, no illegal 
detentions, and torture is exceptional and extra judiciary  murders are ex-
tremely rare sourced from Gibney et al. (2012) 
Per capita GDP (log) 
GDP per head in 2000 US$ constant prices sourced from the World 
Development Indicators 2015, World Bank. 
Polity democracy index 
 
Based on Polity IV index which is coded on the -10 to +10 scale wherein 
+10 denotes full democracy and vice-versa. 
Infrastructure 
 
Total electricity consumption in kilowatts per capita (logged) sourced from 
the International statistics database of the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), USA. 
Population (log) 
Total population count (logged) sourced from the World Development 
Indicators 2015, World Bank. 
GDP growth rate 
Rate of growth of GDP Of country i in year t sourced from UNCTAD 
statistics 2015. 
Economic crisis 
 
Coded the value 1 if country i in year t faced with either/or debt, currency 
and banking crises and 0 otherwise sourced from Laeven and Valencia 
(2013). 
Media reporting 
 
Count of media report events on human rights abuse in country i in year t 
reported in New York Times and constructed by Richard Nielsen (2013) 
until 2004 and the dataset is extended from there-on based on own 
construction.  
Conflict 
Dummy coded 1 for each year a country has at least one active (inter-state 
and/or intra state) conflict obtained from Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 
2016 originally constructed by Gleditsch et al. 2002. 
NGO shaming 
Annual count of shaming incidents by NGOs (logged) reported in Reuters 
Global News Service reports and sourced from Peterson, Murdie and Asal 
(2016) 
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Table 1A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Additional control variables] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1B: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Additional control variables] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1C: Conditional effects of UNHRCC condemnations and media reporting  
[Additional control variables] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Excluding outliers in FDI] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2B: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Excluding outliers in FDI] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2C: Conditional effects of UNHRCC condemnations and media reporting  
[Excluding outliers in FDI] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Post-Cold War period sample] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3B: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Post-Cold War period sample] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3C: Conditional effects of UNHRCC condemnations and media reporting  
[Post-Cold War period sample] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Post-UNHR council period sample, 2006-2013] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4B: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Post-UNHR council period sample, 2006-2013] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[controlling for NGOs and INGOs log] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5B: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[controlling for NGOs and INGOs log] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5C: Conditional effects of UNHRCC condemnations and media reporting  
[controlling for NGOs and INGOs log] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Treatment Regression Estimator] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[controlling for Global FDI flows] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Replacing Polity index with Freedom House index] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8B: Decomposition of UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[Replacing Polity index with Freedom House index] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9A: UNHRCC condemnations, human rights abuse and FDI inflows  
[2SLS-IV estimations] 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9B: First-step regressions of the 2SLS-IV estimations 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9C: Reduced form regressions (related to 2SLS-IV estimations) 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
